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This paper analyses and compares potential efficiency gains induced by the introduction of 
product market competition and cross boarder trade in the piped water market. We argue 
that due to the specific circumstances in the water sector product market competition, i.e. 
competition by common carriage is not expected to be very intensive. The connection of 
networks could alternatively be used for cross boarder trade between neighboured water 
utilities. We show that competition by common carriage leads to production incentives for 
the inefficient supplier. This implies that the retail prices tend to be lower than with cross 
border trade. However, the efficiency effect dominates and resulting welfare is higher in 
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1. Introduction 
 
The existing organisation of piped water supply in Europe is very heterogeneous. In most 
countries water supply is organised on a local level. Historically, the communities are 
responsible for water supply systems such as treatment and storage facilities or pipe 
networks since water supply is widely seen as a natural monopoly. In addition, local 
authorities choose the form of organisation and the permitted degree of private sector 
participation. Due to these decentralised structures water supply in most European 
countries is characterised by a high number of locally operating monopolies.1 Such local 
operators often face very different marginal production costs due to differences in 
production scales and the use of different raw water resources such as surface, ground or 
spring water (see e.g. Correia and Kraemer 1997). As a result retail prices vary 
significantly ￿ even between neighboured water utilities. The obvious question is how to 
overcome this puzzling inefficiency. Some countries such as England and Wales or France 
introduced a process of privatisation in the water industry. However, as Feigenbaum and 
Teeples (1983) showed, different ownership structures do not explain efficiency differentials 
in communal water supply. That means, the pure changing of ownership structures does 
not necessarily enhance the efficiency of water supply. Rather such process has to be 
combined with further measures. Prima facie there are three ways to improve productive 
efficiency: concentration, competition or increased trade (see also Ludin et. al., p. 3). In fact 
there has been a progressive concentration process in countries such as Belgium or the 
Netherlands.2 However in most other countries concentration is not a feasible opportunity 
due to political, legal or geographical restrictions. Taking this into account, it is the purpose 
of this paper to compare welfare gains of the latter two alternatives, e.g. competition in the 
market and trade. In a model that assumes privatised ownership structures and therefore 
p r o f i t  m a x i m i s i n g  c o m p a n i e s  w e  s h o w  t h a t  w e l f a r e  g a i n s  t e n d  t o  b e  h i g h e r  i n  c a s e  o f  
unregulated, voluntary trade. Obviously such result impairs the potential benefits of 
competition. 
Only a few European countries such as France, Italy or England and Wales 
introduced some degree of competition in the water sector. France and since recently Italy 
implemented competition by the model of franchise bidding based on the idea of 
competition for the market. England and Wales have chosen a model of product market 
competition based on competition in the market. One main element of such competition is 
common carriage. The concept is based on the interconnection of networks, similar to 
                                                           
1 There are more than 6500 local operators in Germany, about 8000 in Italy, 3000 in Switzerland and about 2000 
in Sweden (see EEB 2002, p. 24 - 28). 
2 In Belgium there are currently 109 waterworks, 93 percent of total production is concentrated in the hands of 
only 10 companies. And the Netherlands reduced the number of its government-owned water utilities from 111 to 
only 24 companies (see EEB 2002, p. 26). 3 
telecommunication, electricity or gas. However, due to difficulties in the regulation of access 
prices and the physical characters of water, competition is expected to be weak and very 
local.3 A second way to enhance efficiency might be increasing cooperation between 
neighboured utilities. One main element of such cooperation model is the exchange of 
treated water resources based on trade. Since water utilities often use different raw water 
qualities and therefore face different marginal production costs, trade between neighboured 
suppliers is expected to reduce total costs. In fact water trade is already practiced in several 
countries. However, in most cases trade is only used in order to balance peaks of demand, 
since the non-profit oriented communal water utilities usually try to be as independent as 
possible. Hence, trade does not happen even when costs vary significantly between 
neighboured utilities. Obviously an increasing and systematic implementation of trade 
could induce extensive efficiency and therefore welfare gains.  
However, such model of cross border trade obviously resembles the above described 
model of competition by common carriage. The connection of networks could rather be used 
for water trade than for competition by common carriage. In both models local and 
neighboured water suppliers connect their networks and exchange water. Both, trade and 
competition causes the more efficient utilities to increase and the less efficient utilities to 
reduce production volume. One could raise the question whether competition is very useful 
since welfare gains are expected to be small due to the limited degree of competition and 
the emerging regulation costs. Indeed we show that simple cross boarder trade has similar 
or even stronger positive effects on welfare than competition ￿ even when retail prices are 
higher. The reason is that competition by common carriage leads to stronger production 
incentives for the inefficient supplier. 
There is little literature addressing the issue of competition in the market applied 
to the piped water sector. For instance Cowan (1993 and 1997), Webb and Erhardt (1998), 
Grout (2002) or Scheele (2000) describe and discuss the opportunity of competition by 
common carriage in the water sector. Foellmi and Meister (2003) analyse potential 
efficiency gains of product market competition but they do not consider trade. There is a 
wide range of literature related to the trade of water  rights.4 However, there are few 
authors analysing spot water markets: Howitt (1998) shows that spot markets are better 
than water rights markets to stabilise water availability and Calatrava and Garrido (2003) 
show that spot water markets allow farmers to reduce their risk exposure caused by 
unstable water supply. Carey and Zilberman (2002) investigate farmers￿ investment into 
                                                           
3 Nevertheless, the English water regulator Office of Water Services (Ofwat) intends to strengthen competition by 
the model of common carriage trough the Competition Act 1998 and the guidance on the development of access 
codes which were published in 2002.  
4 Hearn and Easter (1997) describe gains from the trading of water rights in Chile, Rosengrant and Binswanger 
(1994) present potential efficiency gains in developing countries, Pigram (1993) analyses property rights and water 
markets in Australia and Becker (1995) discusses potential gains from trade in Israel. 4 
irrigation technology under uncertainty and follow that farmers having access to a spot 
water market. Due to price uncertainty the option to delay investment has a positive value, 
thus farmers will not invest until the expected present value of investment sufficiently 
exceeds the cost of investment. There is some literature analysing bargaining processes and 
bargaining power on water markets: Kajisa and Sakurai (2000) examine water markets in 
India, Meinzen-Dick (1997) groundwater markets in Pakistan. However, these literature 
addresses in particular water trade related to agricultural issues while our paper rather 
discusses trade between neighboured water utilities rendering water services to final 
customers such as households or industry. David M. Newbery (1996) introduced a model 
which combines competition and trade in the network industry. The model assumes two 
suppliers that compete in a single downstream gas market. Both pay a fee for using the 
network which connects the market to the upstream gas producers. Newbery shows that if 
the suppliers can trade capacity rights amongst each other, they can use the price of these 
rights to support the joint profit-maximising downstream price. However, such setting is 
not usable in the piped water market with vertically integrated water utilities. To the best 
of our knowledge there is no literature addressing the analysis respectively the comparison 
of trade and competition between local water utilities.  
Section 2 of this paper provides evidence on competition and trade in the European 
water market. In section 3 we set up a general model that considers the physical 
restrictions in the water sector, the difficulties of regulation and different bargaining power 
to analyse the effects of competition and trade. We then compare the effects of competition 
and trade on productive efficiency, retail prices and welfare, and the distribution of profits 
between firms. In section 4 we consider an example with linear demand and constant 
marginal costs. Under these assumptions retail prices are lower in competition. However, 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus is higher in the trade case. In the same section 
we investigate the effects of regulation ￿ regulation of access prices on the one side and 
regulation of retail prices on the other side. In section 5 we present a simulation of the 
model. It shows that the result of the linear case holds as well for more general demand and 
cost functions: welfare tends always to be higher in trade, since the productive efficiency 
effect dominates. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Competition and Trade in the Water Industry 
 
2.1 Product Market Competition 
 
Several European countries such as France, Italy, England and Wales introduced at least 
some degree of competition in the piped water sector. France and since recently Italy 5 
applied a concession model, based on the idea of competition for the market. The 
municipalities auction a monopoly concession for a defined time period and for a given set 
of performance parameters ￿ in accordance with the franchise bidding model originally 
proposed by Demsetz (1968). However, England and Wales have chosen a different way, 
based on competition in the market, called product market competition. After the entire 
privatisation of water service companies in 1989, competition in the market was 
established through three basic channels (see Scheele, 2000 or Kurukulasuriya, 2001): inset 
appointments, boarder line competition, and common carriage. Inset appointments ￿ 
licensees issued by the water regulator Ofwat ￿ allow new entrants to supply customers in 
a defined geographical area. However, initially Ofwat limited the permission of inset 
appointments for sites that were not already connected and that ware more than 30 meters 
away from the local water supplier￿s pipe network.5 Boarder line competition allows 
customers that are located at the boarder of a supply area to purchase water from an 
existing neighboured utility. Finally common carriage is the model of interconnection. Two 
or more rival companies render water services in the same area and customers are free to 
choose their water supplier. In such a competition model former monopolists connect their 
water networks in order to allow each other access to their distribution pipes ￿ analogous to 
telecommunication, electricity or gas (see BMWi 2001, p. 11-28). Companies are therefore 
able to serve customers connected to another company￿s network. Obviously a market 
entrant has to use the incumbent￿s water pipe network to serve these customers. Providing 
such distribution services allows the incumbent to charge a so called access fee to the 
market entrant ￿ analogous to the interconnection fee in the telecommunication sector. 
However, upstream services such as raw water extraction, treatment and storing and 
further services such as billing or collecting payments are done by a market entrant. 
So far the main source of competition in England and Wales has been the inset 
appointments. However, competition has not been very intense ￿ up to 2001 only 6 inset 
appointments were applied (see Kurukulasuriya 2001, p. 21). The implementation of the 
Competition Act 1998 which came into effect March 2000 was intended to boost the degree 
of rivalry. In particular competition by common carriage should be strengthened by 
facilitating access to the pipe networks. Based on the Act the regulator Ofwat published in 
2002 guidance on the development of access codes (see Ofwat 2002, p. 1) that defines the 
terms of access.  
However, due to the specific technical issues in the water sector, product market 
competition by common carriage is not expected to be as efficient as in sectors like 
telecommunication or electricity (see BMWi 2001, p. 24). In contrast to telecommunication 
                                                           
5 The 30-meter rule was removed in 1992. Today inset appointments are available for new customers (not yet 
connected) or major customers (consuming more than 100￿000 m3 per year). Moreover customer of every scale can 
change their supplier provided that their previous supplier agrees on it (see Scheele, 2000, p. 14) 6 
or electricity water networks are rather local than national since there are limitations of 
network connection due to specific technical aspects in the water sector. On the one side 
there are limitations of mixing different water qualities, since it raises the possibility of 
leaching and corrosion of pipes, sedimentation and suspension of particles and it affects 
microbial quality (see Kurukulasauiya 2001, p. 24). On the other side there are limitations 
of transport. In contrast to electricity the transportation of water causes significant 
marginal costs due to pumping requirements. Furthermore transportation over long 
distances affects the quality of the water in a negative way (see BMWi 2001, p. 24). To sum 
up, due to this limitations competition by common carriage tends to occur only at a regional 
or even local level. 
Furthermore competition in the water sector could be restricted by market power of 
incumbents. They could defend their monopoly position by charging unrealistic high access 
prices. However, one could argue that a regulator can enforce lower access prices, e.g. prices 
based on the incumbent￿s long run incremental network costs. In fact effective regulation of 
access charges in the water sector is very complex, since the costs of using water pipe 
networks depend on various technical aspects such as age or material of pipes, pumping 
requirements, water pressure etc. And since these costs vary significantly between local 
networks, the access fees would have to be set in an individual manner ￿ other than in 
telecommunications. Simon Cowan (1997, p. 91) follows that the regulatory burden of 
assessing access prices for different companies￿ networks would therefore be large. Actually 
the regulator Ofwat does not explicitly regulate access charges ex ante.6 Based on these 
circumstances the effectiveness of competition in the market would be doubtful. The World 
Bank even raises the question whether efficiency gains from competition outweigh the costs 




Cross border trade between neighboured water suppliers is more common than competition 
by access. Treated water is exchanged between independent neighboured water utilities or 
￿ which is more common ￿ between utilities that are members of partnerships of 
convenience, in Germany called Zweckverbaende. Partnerships of convenience are 
voluntary associations between independent municipalities that intend to fulfil a certain 
public task such as water supply or waste water disposal as a collective. About 17 percent of 
                                                           
6 It rather defines general terms for the calculation of access prices. On the basis of the guidance water companies 
have to publish their specific access codes including indicative or standard prices for access. Ofwat require 
companies to not to set indicative prices unrealistically high to deter entrants. Prices can be calculated on the 
basis of average accounting costs, long run marginal costs or based on the efficient component pricing rule (see 
Ofwat 2002, p. 20-22). 
 7 
German water suppliers are organised in such partnerships (see BGW 1999). According to 
Ludin et al. (2000) these partnerships are mainly motivated by insufficient enterprise 
scales on the one side and technical aspects such as hydrologic and hydrogeologic conditions 
on the other side. A partnership of conveniences usually has a self-contained legal form of 
organisation and acts as public corporation. Hence, in most cases it describes rather a 
merger of neighboured water utilities than trade between independent water suppliers. 
However, purer forms of water trade between utilities exist as well. German water 
suppliers such as Bodenseewasserversorgung (BWV), Harzwasserwerke or Gelsenwasser 
with extended treatment capacities sell water to neighboured or even distant water 
utilities. BWV is the largest German water supplier that provides about 4 million 
inhabitants. It is basically organised as a partnerships of convenience that sells treated 
water to its members and to third parties. The 177 members of the partnership are 
communities, local authorities association, partnerships of convenience themselves or other 
public bodies such as public water companies. They possess their own network and storage 
facilities but they can buy treated water and further services such as consulting, planning, 
laboratory services etc. from the BWV (see ZVBWV 2003, p 1-3). In order to sell water to its 
members, BWV builds and operates facilities for extraction, treatment and storage. 
Furthermore it builds and operates the necessary supply pipes that allow the water 
transmission into the member￿s local pipe networks. However, BWV is not a profit-oriented 
company. It sells water and further services based on costs, conditions are for all members 
the same.7 
Water trade between utilities is also practiced in other countries, e.g. Switzerland. 
Switzerland￿s largest water supplier is the Zurich water utility (WVZ). It provides about 
460￿000 inhabitants of the Zurich city directly, furthermore it sells water to contractual 
partners, represented by 67 communities in the nearer region of Zurich with 420￿000 
inhabitants.8 These communities have their own local public water suppliers. However, 
only in case of demand peaks they buy treated water from the WVZ that disposes of 
extended treatment capacities due to the use of surface water. The relevant price is based 
on costs and is calculated identical for each partner. Approximately 20 Percent of WVZ￿s 
total water production is sold to contractual partners (see WVZ 2004). Obviously the 
extension of trade is restricted by the same specific technical issues as product market 
competition. Limitations of mixing different water qualities, extensive coordination 
requirements for the exchange of treated water and diseconomies of scales due to pumping 
                                                           
7 In contrast, the smaller water suppliers Harzwasserwerke Ltd. and Gelsenwasser inc. are organised as private 
and profit-oriented companies. 
8 The large number of partners might be surprising, since mixing different water qualities usually needs extensive 
coordination effort. However, none of the WVZ￿s partners use complex treatment technologies. They exclusively 
use spring or ground water and do not need the addition of any chemicals. Mixing their water with the WVZ￿s 
treated water is therefore unproblematic and requires only a minimum coordination effort. 8 




3 A Model of Competition and Trade 
 
As we explained above both competition and trade are expected to occur on a regional or 
even local level. The above mentioned specifications in the water industry limit the number 
of networks that can be connected in order to exchange water. To keep the following 
analysis simple, we assume a network connection of only two neighboured utilities. And 
since favourable raw water resources such as spring and groundwater are limited and the 
construction of new treatment facilities causes high sunk costs, we exclude the entrance of 
new water suppliers and focus only existing water utilities. Figure 1 describes the basic 











Figure 1 : Connection of two neighboured water networks 
 
 
By connecting their networks 1 and 2, two suppliers A and B are able to exchange treated 
water. As shown in figure 1 the vertically integrated suppliers A and B can be asymmetric. 
Depending on production scale and the quality of used raw water resources, water 
supplier￿s marginal costs can differ significantly.9 Since water supply is very capital 
intensive, we assume that utilities choose rather quantities and capacities than prices. Our 
                                                           
9 Using spring water usually needs no treatment and is therefore less expansive than ground or surface water. 
These raw water resources need extensive treatment such as screening, flocculation, clarification, filtration, the 
addition of chemicals or the use of ultraviolet light. In fact marginal costs vary significantly between water 
suppliers. Renzetti (1992) estimates marginal costs of waterworks in Vancouver that range from $0,53/m3 to 
$0.85/m3. Existing cost differentials are in practice often reflected in a wide range of water tariffs. E.g. in France 
tariffs varied between 0,42 FF and 10,92 FF per cubic meter (see Correia and Kraemer 1997). 
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model is therefore based on a Cournot competition. And since the treated water of both 
suppliers is mixed within the water pipe system, we assume homogenous goods. 
Due to water treatment and pumping requirements the production of water causes 
variable costs Cj(• ), j ∈  { A, B} .  Fixed costs such as network investment and maintenance 
costs are omitted since they are irrelevant for the optimisation problem under concern. 
Without loss of generality we assume that utility B has lower marginal costs than utility A. 
We assume that the more efficient utility B does not face relevant capacity constraints due 
to sufficient availability of high quality raw water resources. Utility B￿s marginal costs are 
therefore assumed to be constant, CB￿ = cB. On the other hand supplier A￿s marginal costs 
are assumed to be increasing, CA￿ > 0 and CA￿￿ ≥  0 .10 
We restrict our analysis to a pure linear pricing regime. Access and trade prices are 
assumed to be linear. Of course the analysis could be extended to a non-linear pricing 
regime. However, results would not change fundamentally. But one would get the well-




Supplier A with higher marginal costs generates earnings in two different ways: Selling 
water to customers connected to the own network and levying an access charge. It can be 
shown (Foellmi and Meister, 2003) that the inefficient supplier will not sell water to 
customers connected to the low-cost-competitor￿s network. The profit of a supplier A is 
given as follows: 
 
) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A A B A B A A q C q a q q q p − + + = Π        (1) 
 
where p1 denotes the retail prices in market 1. q1A stands for the quantity of sold water 
produced by A to customers connected to network 1, q1B stands for the quantity of sold 
water produced by B to customers connected to network 1. Utility A levies an access charge 
which consists of a variable access price a1. As there is no regulation, A is free to set the 
access charge. And as B￿s marginal costs are constant, its decision problem can be fully 
described by considering its profits from market 1. Such profit from market 1 is given as 
follows:  
                                                           
10 The assumption of increasing marginal costs is appropriate for utilities facing relevant capacity constraints 
because of the production structure in the water industry. According to a study of Dwr Cymru Welsh Water (1999) 
water supplier￿s operative costs are mainly influenced by the complexity of water treatment. In order to minimise 
treatment costs, utilities firstly use raw water resources of high quality such as spring water. To overcome 
capacity constraints they use further resources with poorer quality and therefore higher treatment requirements 
such as groundwater or surface water. Due to this reasoning, marginal costs of drinking water production are 
obviously increasing in output. 10 
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The model consists of two stages. In a first stage supplier A chooses the access 
prices a1. Given the access charge A and B simultaneously set production quantities q1A and 
q1B in the second stage.11 In order to compare welfare between the competition and the 
trade model we have to analyse the relevant effects on retail prices and production 
efficiency. We solve the model by backwards induction. Given a1, the firms choose their 
quantities q1A and q1B.: 
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price a1: 
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where the quantity reaction of B,  1 1 /da dq B , can be determined by differentiation of 
equation (4). It is given by  
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=  (6). 
 
Note that  0 ' 2 ' ' 1 1 1 < + p p q B  follows from the second order conditions of profit maximization. 
The less efficient supplier A has incentives to reduce its own production volume and to give 
up some market share to its competitor B. In order to compare welfare between the 
competition and the trade model we have to analyse the relevant effects on retail prices and 
production efficiency. We firstly analyse p1 under the assumption that utility A still 
                                                           
11 Obviously supplier A would be able to prevent any competition by charging extensive high access charges in the 
first stage. On the second stage A and B would choose q2A respectively q1B equal to zero ￿ access would not take 
place. Allowing common carriage would not have any positive welfare effects compared to a situation, where two 
independent monopolists act in their own markets. However, it can be shown (see Foellmi and Meister, 2003), that 
the inefficient utility A voluntarily opens its network to the low-cost competitor B. 11 
produces a positive amount of water itself. By using equation (6) in (5), solving it for a1 and 
inserting the result into (4) we can derive the relevant retail price in market 1.  
 
[] B B A c q q p p q p p q q p + + + + + − = ) ( ' ' ' 2 ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  (7), 
 
where q1 = q1A + q1B. Of course (7) holds only if the implied value of p1 is larger than  ) 0 ( ' A C . 
Otherwise, when the implied market price p1 is equal or smaller than A￿s marginal costs, A 
decides to stop own production. In that case the price p1 follows directly from (4) and (5) and 
q1A = 0.  
 
B B B c p p q q p + + − = ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1 1 1  (8) 
 
Because in both cases the high-cost utility A reduces own production and the low-cost 
utility B increases production, the differential of A￿s and B￿s marginal costs diminishes and 
overall efficiency in the water market increases. Due to decreasing marginal production 
costs in market 1 the introduction of competition reduces retail prices and raises sold water 
volume. Obviously welfare must be higher than in the status quo, where the two utilities 
act as independent monopolists. However, since A levies a positive linear access price a1, 
welfare is negatively affected by a double marginalisation problem. In its decisions about 
quantities and therefore prices utility B faces relevant marginal costs of (cB + a1). Hence B 
will limit its engagement q1B in market 1 below the socially optimal amount, which would 
guarantee efficiency of production. In fact if B would be monopolist in market 1, according 
to the Amoroso Robinson equation he would set  B B c q p p + − = 1 1 1 '  which is smaller than the 
p1 in equation (8), since  B B B B B B c p p q q p q c q p + + − − < + − ) ' 2 ' ' ( ' ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  and  0 ' 2 ' ' 1 1 1 < + p p q B  
according to equation (6). 
In both cases supplier A and B share the additional profit resulting from the 
introduction of competition. In our analysis we forbear from doing a more detailed analysis 




In section 3.1 we showed that introducing product market competition between 
neighboured water utilities can lead to significant efficiency and therefore welfare gains in 
the water industry. However, one could argue that similar effects could result from 
introducing unregulated cross border trade amongst neighboured utilities. It is obvious that 
a high cost utility A has incentives to buy treated water from the more efficient utility B 12 
that faces lower marginal costs of water treatment. Buying inexpensive water from B 
allows A to reduce own water treatment respectively to reduce the use of inferior raw water 
resources and therefore cost of production. B on the other side can earn additional profit by 
these trading activities. B can therefore generate revenues by selling water to customers 
connected to its network 1 on the one side and by selling water to its neighboured water 
utility A on the other side. Due to the constant marginal costs cB we focus our analysis to 
B￿s trading activities. Again due to the constant marginal costs cB the decision problem of B 
reduces to the analysis of its trading activities. The profit from these activities can be 
calculated as follows:  
 
) ( ) ( T T B T T T B p q c p p q − = Π        ( 9 ) ,  
 
where qT stands for the quantity of water that B sells to A and pT describes the trade price. 
A on the other side derives revenues solely from selling water to customers located in 
network 1. A￿s production costs consist of increasing marginal treatment costs CA(q1A) and 
of payments for purchased water qT. Own production of A is now denoted by qA to avoid 
confusion with the competition case. A￿s profit can therefore be defined as follows:  
 
T T A A T A A q p q C q q q p − − + = Π ) ( ) )( ( 1 1      (10), 
 
where q1 = qA + qT.  
 
  The above described trade model implies the existence of three different market 
places: On the one side the retail markets 1 and 2, on the other side the wholesale market 
for treated water resources. Since both utilities act as independent monopolists in their 
retail markets 1 respectively 2, p1 and p2 result from monopolistic profit maximisation 
behaviour of A respectively B. The wholesale respectively trade market is characterised by 
a bilateral monopoly. One seller and one buyer bargain over the trade price respectively the 
traded water quantity and therefore the allocation of potential gains from trade. As 
mentioned above gains from trade are expected to be positive, since B￿s marginal costs are 
assumed to be lower than A￿s marginal costs. 
According to Nash (1950) fully informed players would agree on a contract that 
maximises total gains from trade. The relevant bargaining solution is Pareto efficient. 
Assuming completely symmetric players would induce a contract that yields equal payoffs 
for both players. However, our model describes trade between fully informed but unequal 
players. It follows that the relevant bargaining power of the two parties can be different. 
According to several empirical studies addressing the issue of bargaining over prices in 13 
bilateral monopolies (e.g. Chipty and Snyder, 1999, Kauf, 1999, Kajisa and Sakurai, 2000) 
relative power depends on various individual characteristics of buyer and seller. Kajisa and 
Sakurai examine these characteristics for water trade in the agrarian sector in India.12 
According to their analysis seller￿s power is for instance positively correlated with its 
physical capital respectively total amount of investment into the water production facilities.  
For simplicity we assume in the following that bargaining weights are exogenous. 
In particular we focus on the two polar cases, where only the seller respectively the buyer 
has the entire bargaining power. Of course, in the above described bilateral monopoly 
situation one could expect bargaining power to be more evenly distributed, but these 
extreme cases allow simple and illustrative conclusions. 
 
3.2.1 Utility B has the entire Bargaining Power 
 
First we focus a situation where the more efficient utility B has the entire bargaining power 
on the wholesale market. Since large water suppliers with extensive production capacities 
usually provide more than one utility with treated water, there are good reasons to assume 
that the utility which sells water resources has the main bargaining power on each of these 
single water markets. We assume the polar case, where utility B has the entire bargaining 
power. That means seller B defines the relevant trade price and makes a ￿take it or leave 
it￿ offer to utility A. Obviously B sets a trade price that maximises its profit from trading 
activities described by equation (9). Maximization of B￿s trade profit with respect to pT 
yields to the following first order condition: 
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In order to define  T T p q ∂ ∂ / which describes the slope of A￿s demand function for treated 
water on a trading market we need to analyse its profit, which is described by equation 
(10). Maximization of A￿s profit with respect to qA and qT yields the following first order 
conditions: 
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12 Kajisa and Sakurai analyse the price determination in water transactions between neighboured farmers in 
Madhya Pradesh in India. Farmers which do not own irrigation systems consisting of electric pumps, wells and 
water conveyance systems have to buy water resources from farmers owning such systems.  14 
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In case of utility A decides to produce itself a positive amount of water (qA > 0) inequation 
(12) turns into an equation. Total differentiation of (12) and (13) and applying Cramer￿s 
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      (14)  if     qA > 0 
 
where MRA =  1 / q A ∂ Π ∂  denotes A￿s marginal revenues (∂MRA / ∂q1 < 0). Note that the above 
defined slope of the demand curve is only valid when utility A produces water as well (qA > 
0). If CA￿(0) exceeds pT, A gives up own production and becomes a pure water broker. In this 
case A purchases the entire amount of water which is necessary to cover demand in market 
1. Obviously this can happen when A is very inefficient compared to B. In order to define 
now the slope of the demand curve we can neglect inequation (12), since qA =   0. Total 
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The demand curve is less elastic after utility A decides to stop own production (qA = 0), 
since the right hand side of equation (15) is less negative than the right hand side of (15). A 
is therefore more sensitive to changes in pT when it still produces itself (qA > 0). If A still 
produces own water, an increasing trade price pT would make A expand its own production 
￿ A would substitute qT by qA. A higher CA￿￿ reduces A￿s opportunities to substitute qT by qA 
since own water production would be too costly. A steeper marginal cost curve reduces 










       
Figure 2: Demand for traded water 
 
 
A decides to stop own production when  ) 0 ( ' A C > pT. In this case own production is more 
expensive than purchasing water from the neighboured utility B. As mentioned above, the 
demand curve changes its slope depending whether A produces a positive amount of water 
or not (see Figure 2). The relevant bend in the demand curve for traded water must 
therefore be at a trade price pT =  ) 0 ( ' A C .  
After defining A￿s demand curve we are able to compare the trade model with the 
competition model. In order to compare all possible states of competition and trade, we have 
to take into consideration that in both models A can decide to keep own water production 
(q1A > 0) or to give it up completely (qA = 0). Effects regarding welfare can be different in 
these two states. Therefore we have to analyze the following three cases in order to compare 
the trade with the competition model:  
 
 
  Case 1 
1 ˆ ) 0 ( ' p CA ≥  
Case 2a 
T A p C p ˆ ) 0 ( ' ˆ1 > >  
Case 2b 
T A p C ˆ ) 0 ( ' =  
Case 3 
T A p C ˆ ) 0 ( ' <  
Trade  qA = 0  qA = 0  qA > 0 
Competition  q1A = 0  q1A > 0  q1A > 0 
Table 1: Cases to compare 
 
 
1 ˆ p  respectively  T p ˆ  denote the equilibrium values for the retail price in market 1 











costs from case 1 to case 313. According to equation (3) in the competition model A produces 
a positive amount of water if and only if  ) 0 ( ' ˆ1 A C p > . And according to equation (13) and 
(12) in the trade model A produces a positive amount of water only if  T p p ˆ ˆ1 >  respectively 
1 ˆ ) 0 ( ' p CA < . Obviously A￿s incentives to produce a positive amount of water are stronger in 
the competition than in the trade model.14 W e  d i v i d e  c a s e  2  i n  2 a  a n d  2 b  i n  o r d e r  t o  
consider different trade prices due to the bend in the demand curve for traded water (see 
Figure 2). 
Case 1 compares competition to trade when A decides to give up completely its own 
production. In both models only B produces a positive amount of water. In order to evaluate 
this case regarding welfare, we define the relevant prices p1 on market 1. Using equation 
(5) in (4) and taking into account that there are no effects on quantities in market 2 since cB 
stays constant, we can give a relation for the retail price p1 on market 1 in the competition 
model as follows: 
 
B B B c p p q q p + + − = ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1 1 1        ( 1 6 )  
 
In order to solve for the price p1 on market 1 in the trade model we use equations (14) and 
(15) in (11): 
 
B T T c p p q q p + + − = ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1        ( 1 7 )  
 
Since A does not produce any amount of water by itself, qT corresponds to q1 respectively 
q1B. In this case retail prices on market 1 are identical in the competition and the trade 
model. And since only B produces a positive amount of water, marginal costs of production 
are in both models similar, namely cB. Therefore in both models highest possible production 
efficiency can be achieved. Obviously the resulting welfare corresponds in both models to 
the same level. Furthermore consumers are indifferent between competition and trade.  
Case 2a compares the competition model, where A keeps its own water production, 
to the trade model, where A completely gives up its water production. Since the trade model 
                                                           
13 Comparing the different cases in table 1 the reader should note that the prices (may) change when we vary 
CA￿(0). It is easy to see that the separation into the different cases is still applicable. Let us start in case 1 where 
CA￿(0) is high. When CA￿(0) decreases p1 remains fixed as long as qA = q1A = 0. When we enter Case 2a ￿ where q1A > 
0 ￿ price p1 begins to fall. However it cannot fall below CA￿(0)  again. Otherwise A would choose q1A = 0 and p1 
would be equal to that in case 1. But this price is higher than CA￿(0)  contradicting our assumption. For case 2b and 
3 the argument is analogous. 
14 Consider, A has high marginal costs and does not produce any amount of water. However, technical invention 
reduces A￿s marginal costs. According to equation (3) A starts to produce a positive amount of water when p1 > 
CA￿(0). In case of trade A starts to produce when p1 > pT  and  pT > CA￿(0) . Because of this double marginalisation 
argument A￿s incentives to produce a positive amount of water are stronger in case of competition. 
 17 
in case 2a is similar as in case 1, equation (17) still holds. However, prices in the access 
model are defined different since both utilities produce a positive amount of water. By 
inserting equation (5) into (4) and taking into consideration that q1 = q1A + q1B we derive the 
retail price p1 in market 1 for the competition model: 
 
[] B B A c q q p p q p p q q p + + + + + − = ) ( ' ' ' 2 ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1      (18) 
 
Comparing equation (18) to (17) respectively (16) we can define the difference of prices in 
the competition and trade model. Obviously such difference is caused by the following 
term15:  [] ) ( ' ' ' 2 1 1 1 1 1 B A q q p p q + + . This term can be positive or negative, depending on the 
curvature of the demand curve in market 1, which is determined by  ' ' 1 p . Price p1 in the 
competition model is smaller in the competition case, if the demand curve is concave or 
linear or only minor convex. Only in case of a strong convex demand curve p1 tends to be 
smaller in the trade case. However, independent from the demand￿s curvature, the net 
effect regarding welfare is apparently not clear. Production efficiency in the trade model 
must be higher since only B produces a positive amount of water at marginal costs cB. In 
the competition model both utilities produce a positive amount of water. And since 
) ˆ ( ' 1A A B q C c <  overall production costs are not minimised in case of competition. 
Consumers in market 1 are solely interested in their surplus which determined by 
the level of the retail price p1. Obviously they prefer the introduction of competition in case 
of a concave, linear or only minor convex demand curve even when overall production 
efficiency would be lower. However, they prefer the trade model in case of a strong convex 
demand curve. In this case both p1 and overall efficiency would be higher in the trade than 
in the competition model.  
Case 2b is basically similar to case 2a. A keeps its production in the competition 
model but stops production in the trade model. But now the relative difference between 
) 0 ( ' A C  and cB has become smaller such that the marginal costs of B cross the marginal 
revenue curve at the vertical segment (see Figure 2). Hence pT  =  ) 0 ( ' A C . Therefore A 
maximises its profit similar to an independent monopolist facing marginal costs pT. The 
relevant retail price in the trade model reads now: 
 
' ) 0 ( ' 1 1 p q C p T A − =         ( 1 9 )  
                                                           
15 Of course the equilibrium values of the first terms in the equations (18) and (16) can vary, since the relevant 
equilibrium quantities can be different. However, if one would define  [] ) ( ' ' ' 2 1 1 1 1 1 B A q q p p q + +  = 0 in equation (18), 
prices and therefore sold quantities in market 1 would be similar in cases 1 and 2a of the competition model. An 
increasing value of this term obviously increases the equilibrium retail price in case 2a and therefore reduces the 
equilibrium quantity. 18 
 
Obviously this price lies between the trade price of the trade model in case 2a and 3. 
Similar to case 2a production efficiency tends to be higher in the trade model than in the 
competition model since only the more efficient utility B produces a positive amount of 
water.  
  Case 3 compares the trade model to the competition model when both utilities keep 
their water production. Since the competition model has a similar outcome as in case 2, 
equation (18) still holds. However, prices in the trade model are defined different now, since 
A and B produce a positive amount. The demand curve for water on the trade market is 
now defined by equation (14). Using equations (11), (13) and (14) we can derive price p1 in 
the trade model:  
 
B A c p p q q p p q q p p q q p + + + − + + + − = µ µ ) ' 2 ' ' ( ) 1 )( ' 2 ' ' ( ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    (20), 
 
where  [] ) ' ' ' 2 ( ) ( ' ' / ) ( ' ' 1 1 1 p q p q C q C A A A A + − = µ . The term  ) ' ' ' 2 ( 1 1 1 p q p + must be negative since it 
corresponds to the second order condition for A￿s profit maximum.16 Therefore ￿ must be 
smaller than one.17 And since q1 > qA  price p1 in the trade model tends to be smaller than 
in cases 1 and 2a (see equation [17]). This result induces that the relative performance of 
the trade model in case 3 tends to be more advantageous than in 2a. However, it is not 
obvious if p1 tends to be lower than in the competition model of 2b. 
And it is not obvious if in case 3 the retail price p1 in the trade model is still above 
the price level in the competition model. The price differential depends now on the 
curvature of the demand on the one side and the value of  µ µ A q q + − ) 1 ( 1  on the other side. An 
increasing weighted sum of q1 and qA  improves the relevant performance of the trade 
model, i.e. the retail price tends to be lower compared to the price in the competition model. 
Furthermore the relative performance of the trade model can be improved by using a strong 
convex demand curve, since [] 0 ) ( ' ' ' 2 1 1 1 1 > + + B q q p p .  
  Independent from the curvature of the demand curve, production efficiency in the 
trade model is higher than in the competition model ￿ similar to case 2. As already 
mentioned above, A￿s incentives to produce a positive amount of water are stronger in the 
competition model than in the trade model. The amount of traded water must therefore be 
higher than the amount of water sold by B trough access, qT > q1B. This means that the 
more efficient utility B produces in the trade model a higher part of the entire water 
                                                           
16  ' ' 2 1 1 1
2 2 p q p qA A + = ∂ Π ∂  
17 Only if A does not produce any water (q1A = 0) ￿ amounts to 1. In this case (20) is similar to (18).  19 
quantities sold in market 1 and 2. Total production costs are therefore lower than in the 
competition model. 
Apart from the effects regarding retail price and efficiency it is worth to analyse 
effects regarding distribution. One should have in mind, that the roles of A and B differ 
fundamentally in the competition and trade model. In the trade model the less efficient 
utility A acts as a downstream monopolist while in the competition model A is an upstream 
monopolist. An upstream monopolist is able to skim the main part of the overall profit ￿ e.g. 
two thirds in case of a linear demand function. 
 
3.2.2 Utility A has the entire Bargaining Power 
 
In order to complete our analysis we assume that the less efficient utility A has the entire 
bargaining power on the wholesale market. That means the buyer A defines the relevant 
trade price and makes a ￿take it or leave it￿ offer to utility B.18 Having the entire 
bargaining power utility A maximises its own profit represented by equation (9) subject to 
B￿s participation constraint denoted by  T B T T q c q p ≥ . Obviously A would offer a trade price 
pT = cB. Since the trade price exactly covers B￿s marginal costs, B has no incentives to reject 
A￿s offer. Offering a higher trade price would reduce A￿s profit since it causes higher costs, 
offering a smaller trade price would violate B￿s participation constraint. In such a setting 
B￿s marginal cost curve represents the supply curve on the wholesale market for treated 
water. Of course this is a well-known result which goes back at least to Tintner (1939) and 
Morgan (1949).  
Purchasing water from B at a linear price cB  allows  A to reduce its own water 
production and therefore marginal costs. In order to maximise profit A reduces its own 
water production qA until CA￿ is equal to pT respectively cB. If  ) 0 ( ' A C  exceeds pT, A gives up 
own production and becomes a pure water broker. Again the relevant production costs in 
both markets amount to cB. Due to the resulting equalisation of marginal costs overall 
production efficiency in market 1 and 2 and therefore aggregated profit can be improved 
compared to the autarky situation.19 In fact, the equalisation of marginal costs guarantees 
highest possible overall efficiency. Purchasing water resources from B at price pT  = c B 
allows the less efficient utility A to extract the full rent of the additional profit induced by 
the increased efficiency. 
                                                           
18 One might object that such setting is not very intuitive, since it assumes a less efficient utility having all the 
bargaining power. Nevertheless, Kajisa and Sakurai (2000) found some empirical evidence for a weak sellers￿ 
bargaining position in the Indian water market. They argue that social constraints may hinder sellers to enjoy 
unacceptable amounts of excess profits. Of course such constraints might not be very intuitive in a trade model 
with profit-maximising water companies. 
19 Due to decreased marginal costs in market 1 an additional profit can be realised compared to the autarky 
situation. Since cB stay constant, profit in market 2 does not change. 20 
Similar to the trade model in cases 1 and 2 of section 3.2.1 highest possible 
production efficiency can be achieved. However, due to the marginal cost pricing at the 
wholesale market the problem of double marginalisation can be removed. A therefore faces 
exactly the same maximisation problem as an independent monopolist with marginal costs 
cB und sets  B c p q p + − = ' 1 1 1 . Due to the non-existent double marginalisation the relevant 
retail price must be lower and welfare higher than in a trade model where the more 
efficient utility B has some positive bargaining power. However, it is not obvious if p1 is 
lower than in the competition model.  
The distribution of the additional profit is different than in a trade model where B 
has the entire bargaining power. Now, the downstream company A is able to extract the 
entire rent, in the trade model in section 3.2.1 the upstream company B skimmed the main 
part of the rent.  
 
 
4 Linear Example 
 
In order to illustrate the results derived in section 3.2.1 (where B has the entire bargaining 
power in the trade model) more detailed, we consider a linear model. Beside the linear 
access respectively trade prices we assume linear demand and cost functions. However, 
using linear costs for both utilities excludes case 3 because a less efficient utility A would 
never have any incentives to produce a positive amount of water in a trade model since A￿s 
constant marginal production costs (denoted by cA) always exceeds cB. Therefore our linear 
example analyses and compares competition and trade in cases 1 and 2. We define the 
inverse demand in market 1 as follows:  
 
1 1 bq k p − =          ( 2 1 )  
 
First we define retail price p1 and production quantity q1 in the status quo, which is defined 
by the monopoly. We can use the model of independent monopolists as a benchmark for the 
following analysis. Using equation (21) and setting marginal revenues equal to marginal 















=          ( 2 3 )  
 21 
We define the relevant prices and production quantities in the competition model. We 
therefore have to distinguish two different regimes: case 1 where A stops own water 
production (q1A = 0), and case 2 where A keeps own production (q1A > 0). By total 
differentiation of equation (4) and using equation (21) we can define  ) 2 /( 1 / 1 1 b da dq B − = . 























=          ( 2 6 )  
 
However, if the resulting retail price p1 in market 1 exceeds A￿s marginal costs cA, A keeps 
its own production in the competition model (cases 2 and 3).  
 









Obviously A￿s incentives to produce a positive amount of water itself are increasing in B￿s 
marginal costs cB and the reservation price k in market 1. Increasing marginal costs cA 
lower A￿s incentives to produce a positive amount. In order to derive retail price p1 and 
production quantities q1A, q1B in case 2 of the competition model we use equations (3), (4), 
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=          ( 3 1 )  22 
 
We analyse cases 1 and 2 of the trade model where the less efficient utility A stops 
own production and purchase the entire water quantity q1 from utility B. Therefore qA = 0 
respectively q1 = q T. Using equation (15) and (21) allows us to determinate the relevant 
slope of the demand curve for traded water:  ) 2 /( 1 / b p q T T − = ∂ ∂ . Using equations (13), (17) 


























        ( 3 4 )  
 
As already stated in section 3.2.1 the resulting retail price p1 and quantity q1 correspond to 
the relevant values in the competition model where only B produces a positive amount of 
water. Obviously in case 1 the resulting welfare corresponds in both models to the same 
level.  
Now we consider case 2b where  A T c p = ˆ . In such case B￿s marginal cost curve cuts 
its marginal profit curve from trading activities in its vertical range. Then it is profit 
















= =         ( 3 6 )  
A T c p =          ( 3 7 )  
 
Price p1 in case 1 and in the range of the bend would correspond to the same value when 
2 / ) ( 4 / ) 3 ( A B c k c k + = +  respectively  A B c c k = + 2 / ) ( .  
 
Figure 3 illustrates and compares the above derived results. The figure defines 



















Figure 3: Retail price in market 1: Monopoly, trade and competition 
 
 
4.1 Monopoly versus Trade 
 
First we compare the monopoly model with the trade model. In cases 1 and 2a where 
2 / ) ( B A c k c + > , p1 is lower in the trade than in the monopoly model. According to equation 
(34), B charges  A B T c c k p < + = 2 / ) (  to the downstream monopolist A. Since pT is lower than 
A￿s marginal production costs cA, it is profit maximising for A to charge a retail price p1 
which is lower than the one charged by an independent monopolist. Obviously welfare must 
be higher in the trade model since p1 is lower and production efficiency higher than in the 
monopoly case. Consumers profit from lower prices and utilities from higher aggregated 
profit. Due to its position as an upstream company B is able to skim two third of the 
aggregated profit. 
In case 2b where  2 / ) ( B A B c k c c + ≤ <  the relevant price p1 is equal in both models. 
In this range the downstream monopolist A purchases water from B at price pT = cA. 
Obviously A faces exactly the same maximisation problem as an independent monopolist. 
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Case 1 Case 2a Case 2b
Trade24 
same level.20 Nevertheless, net welfare must be higher in the trade model: Since in the 
trade model only the more efficient utility B produces a positive amount of water, 
aggregated profit must be higher due to higher production efficiency. And since B charges 
pT = cA, B is able to skim the entire rent of this additional efficiency. 
 
4.2 Trade versus Competition 
 
As mentioned above the roles of A and B change in these models fundamentally. A acts in 
the trade model as a downstream company, in the competition model as an upstream 












Figure 4: Market structure: trade versus competition 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that p1 in the competition and trade model correspond to the same level in 
case 1 where  A B c c k ≤ + 4 / ) 3 ( . In both models only the more efficient utility B produces a 
positive amount of water. However, in the trade model consumers are exclusively served by 
the downstream company A, in the competition model by the downstream company B. Their 
relevant marginal costs correspond to the same level since  . 1 A T c a p + =  Since both 
downstream companies face similar profit maximisation problems, in equilibrium p1 and q1 
and therefore consumer rent correspond to the same level.21 And since water is only 
produced by the more efficient utility B, aggregated profit must as well be similar. We 
conclude that the resulting welfare is the same in both models. However, the distribution of 
the aggregated profit22 between A and B is different. Being an upstream monopolist in the 
                                                           
20 See equations (21) and (34) respectively equations (22) and (35). 
21 See equations (24) and (32) respectively equations (25) and (33). 
22  b c k B Aggregated 16 / ) ( 3























competition model enables A to skim two third of the aggregated profit. Being a 
downstream monopolist in the trade model allows A to skim only one third of the entire 
profit.  
The equilibrium value of p1 in the trade model exceeds p1 in the competition model 
only if  4 / ) 3 ( B A B c k c c + < < . Such range is defined by cases 2a and 2b. In these cases the 
upstream company in the competition model generates income from two sides: allowing 
access to B and selling water directly. By setting a1 in the first stage of the game A not only 
optimise income from the access business. A decides as well about B￿s relevant marginal 
costs (a1 + cB) and therefore about the terms of the second stage of the game, where A and B 
set production quantities. Obviously the determination of a1 has external effects on the 
performance of A￿s direct business. Raising a1 increases B￿s marginal costs and reduces its 
incentives to engage in market 1.23 However, a lower engagement of B increases the 
relevant retail price p1 and supports A￿s incentives to engage in market 1 directly.24 In 
equilibrium A sets  . 2 / ) ( 1 B c k a − =  The downstream company B in the competition model 
faces total marginal costs of  2 / ) ( 1 B B c k c a + = + . These costs exactly correspond to pT in the 
trade model. In both models downstream companies face similar costs. However, their 
profit maximising behaviour must be different, since in the competition model B faces 
direct competition from A. And since total production quantities are higher in Cournot 
duopoly than in a monopoly, the resulting retail price p1 must be lower in the competition 
model. In fact, p1 in equation (27) is lower than p1 in equation (32) respectively (35).  
However, net effect regarding welfare is not obvious, because average production 
efficiency must be lower in the competition model, since we assumed cB < cA. We can define 
welfare as follows:  
 
B B A A B B A A q c q c q p k c p q c p q q p k W 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) (
2
1
) ( ) ( ) (
2
1
− − + = − + − + − =      (38), 
 
where  q1A = 0 and q1 = q1A + q1B in case of competition and q1 = q1B i n  c a s e  o f  t r a d e .  
Equation (38) illustrates the above mentioned trade off: in the competition model welfare 
tends to be higher due to a lower p1 respectively a higher q1; but it tends to be lower due to 
higher average production costs. In order to compare these welfare effects more detailed, we 
analyse them at the margin between cases 1 and 2a. Starting at  4 / ) 3 ( B A c k c + =  and 
reducing cA by an infinitesimal amount brings us from case 1 to case 2. Figure 3 shows that 
p1 respectively q1A and q1B only change in the competition model. Due to lower costs A gets 
                                                           
23 Such relation can be illustrated apparently by equation (4) of the general model. 
24 Equation (5) in the general model shows that A sets a lower access price a1 in case of q1A = 0.  
 26 
incentives to produce itself a positive amount of water and due to arising competition B 
reduces its engagement in market 1. By differentiating equations (28) and (29) to cA we 
define these reactions at the margin:  b c q A A 3 / 2 / 1 − = ∂ ∂  and  b c q A B 3 / 1 / 1 = ∂ ∂ . Reducing cA 
increases  q1A two times stronger than it reduces q1B. The resulting welfare in the 
competition model would be higher than in the trade model if  ) ( 2 / 1 ) ( 1 1 B A c p c p − > − . 
However, at the point where A just begins production p1 equals c A. The relevant welfare 
gains from increased production are of second order whereas the welfare losses from a 
reduction in B￿s production are of first order. Hence the effect regarding higher production 
efficiency in the trade model exceeds the effect regarding a lower p1 in the competition 
model. Obviously this result also holds with general demand functions and is not due to the 
assumption of linear demand. This is a well-known result from the traditional Cournot 
analysis. The Cournot equilibrium does not equalize marginal costs ￿ except in the 
symmetric case. The industry￿s cost of production is therefore not minimised.  
Again, the upstream monopolist skims the main part of the aggregated profit in 
both models. In the trade model B skims two third of the aggregated profit. However, due to 
the lower production efficiency aggregated profit must be lower in the competition model. 
Obviously A is able to skim more than two third of this aggregated profit ￿ otherwise A 
would not have any incentives to produce itself.  
 
4.3 Shifting the Bargaining Power 
 
The linear analysis can easily be extended to the trade model in section 3.2.2 where the 
entire bargaining power is shifted to the less efficient utility A. Now, utility A can buy 
treated water at a trade price pT = cB. A stops own production completely and purchases the 
entire water from B since cA > pT. As mentioned in section 3.2.2 A therefore faces exactly 
the same maximisation problem as an independent monopolist with marginal costs cB. In 
order to determine the retail price in market 1 we use equation (22) and substitute the 







=          ( 3 9 )  
 
Since k > cA  > cB such retail price must be lower than the relevant retail prices in the 
competition model (see equation [27]) and the trade model where B has the entire 
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Since the entire water sold in market 1 is produced at marginal costs cB highest possible 
production efficiency can be achieved in the trade model. And since the relevant retail price 
p1 is lower than in the competition model and the trade model where B has the entire 
bargaining power, welfare can be improved.  
 
4.4 Introducing Price Regulation 
 
In most European countries water supply is provided by public utilities or regulated private 
companies. In both cases it is assumable that water suppliers￿ freedom to set prices is 
significantly restricted. Up to this point the model does not consider any kind of regulation. 
One might wonder if the above derived results fundamentally change when price regulation 
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First we examine the effects of an access price regulation and then the effects of a retail 
price cap.  
  Traditional regulation theory suggests marginal cost pricing for access in order to 
maximise welfare. Since such a pricing regime describes a first best solution we use it as a 
benchmark. In our model we assumed no marginal costs of water transport and allocation.  
The regulator should therefore set a1 = 0. Again we analyse the effects of B￿s entrance in 
market 1. Since B does not face any marginal costs of using network 1, the problem of 
double marginalisation is removed. Competition in network 1 can be described as an 
ordinary Cournot duopoly competition model. Using equation (21) we derive the relevant 
inverse demand in market 1: 
 
B A bq bq k p 1 1 1 − − =         ( 4 1 )  
 
In a Cournot duopoly where players simultaneously decide about their production 
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where i, j ∈  { A, B}  and i ≠  j. Using equations (41) and (42) we get the relevant retail price p1 
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The regulation of the access price increases the degree of competition in market 1 and 
therefore reduces the relevant retail price compared to unregulated competition and trade. 
Similar to the trade model the less efficient utility A does not have any production 
incentives in cases 1 and 2a because only B produces a positive amount of water when 
2 / ) ( B A c k c + > . Welfare is then the highest in the regulated access price regime25. However, 
marginal cost pricing does not allow the incumbent to cover fixed network costs such as 
costs for investment and maintenance. If the incumbent cannot be compensated by 
subsidies, access prices are required to consider fixed costs. That can be realised by 
charging an additional lump sum fee to the market entrant or by charging a mark up over 
marginal costs. In practice, usually the latter alternative is chosen. In its guidance for the 
access price calculation the English water regulator Ofwat suggests three different 
methodologies: average accounting costs (AAC), long run marginal costs (LRMC) and the 
efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) (see Ofwat 2002, p. 22). However, introducing a 
mark up over short run marginal costs reduces the relative performance of the regulated 
access price regime. Since a1  > 0, B faces marginal costs of access and reduces its 
engagement in market 1. The resulting retail price p1 would be higher than illustrated in 
                                                           
25 However, since A does not charge a variable access price, there is a hazard for inefficient market entry: A would 
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Figure 6. To regulate access prices in practice, sufficient accounting data must be available 
and physical depreciation must be measured adequately. But due to asymmetric 
information an incumbent firm may be able to manipulate such data: While an incumbent 
itself is able to assess costs accurately, the regulator as an outsider cannot observe and 
verify them properly. Additionally the regulation of access prices in the water industry is 
expected to be very complex and costly (see section 2.1). One can follow that water 
suppliers￿ freedom to set access prices is significant.  
  Finally, consider the regulation of retail prices. Ex ante retail price regulation by 
price cap is applied for instance in England and Wales.26 The regulator fixes the retail price 
at 
1 p . Demand in market 1 is then given by  1 1 1 ) ( q p q = . In order to analyse the potential 
effects of regulation we assume that 
1 p  is below the equilibrium retail prices in both models 
competition and trade. Using such price cap implies that consumer surplus must be equal 
in both models. Regulation therefore withdraws the benefit of the competition model 
describes above. The only source of welfare differences can therefore be due to differences in 
production efficiency. Obviously the introduction of the price cap in a trade model does not 
change the overall production efficiency. Again, in the relevant cases 1, 2a and 2b only the 
more efficient utility B produces a positive amount of water. In contrast, the introduction of 
a price cap may change the production efficiency in the competition model. Now, the less 
efficient supplier A faces lower production incentives in case 2a and 2b than in an 
unregulated model, since we assumed () 1 4 / 3 p c k B > + . A keeps its own production in the 
competition model only when cA is below the relevant retail price in market 1. A reduction 
of the retail price due to regulation therefore reduces the less efficient utility￿s production 
incentives. Hence the production efficiency in the competition model can be improved by the 
implementation of a price cap. However, as long as  A c p > 1 the less efficient utility A still 
produces a positive amount of water. Therefore production and welfare efficiency in the 





In section 4 we showed that welfare tends to be higher in the trade than in the unregulated 
competition model. Welfare is equal in both models in case 1 and is higher in the trade 
model at the point where the inefficient utility A enters market 1 (switching from case 1 to 
2a). However, we did not explicitly examine welfare when A produces a strict positive 
                                                           
26 Several other countries such as Switzerland use a different approach. Water utilities operating independently 
from the municipal body calculate their tariffs autonomously and communal authorities are required to approve 
them ex post. Of course, such difference in regulation practice leads to the same outcome in our model. 31 
amount, i.e. interior of cases 2a and 2b. Therefore we simulate in the following the 
(unregulated) model of section 3 and perform some comparative statics. Assuming a more 
general model than in section 4 we allow for non-linear demand and increasing marginal 
costs of A. Since the relative performance of the trade model tends to be stronger when A 
has the entire bargaining power we restrict our analysis to a situation where the more 
efficient utility has the bargain power. And since welfare in the trade model tends to be 
stronger when A produces a positive amount of water (case 3),27 we restrict our analysis to 
situations where A stops own production in the trade model but keeps its production in the 
competition model (case 2). First we define the demand for water in market 1:  
 
η
1 1 bq k p − =         ( 4 3 ) ,  
 
where η determines the curvature of water demand. Marginal costs of utility A are defined 
as follows: 
 
A A A q c c q C 1 0 ) ( ' + =        ( 4 4 )  
 
B￿s marginal costs cB are assumed to be linear. First we apply comparative statics by 
varying A￿s marginal costs. We assume b = 1, η = 1, k = 12, c1 = 1 and cB = 2. Since only 
cases 2 is of our interest, we consider  T A p C p ˆ ) 0 ( ' ˆ1 ≥ >  and c0 > cB. 
 
 
 Trade  Competition  WComp 
(WTrade
/100) 
c0 p 1Trade p T q 1Trade W Trade p 1Comp q 1AComp q 1Comp W Comp  
7.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.000 1.000 3.000  20.000  91.4 
7.5  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.100 0.800 2.900  20.075  91.8 
8.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.200 0.600 2.800  20.300  92.8 
8.5  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.300 0.400 2.700  20.675  94.5 
9.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.400 0.200 2.600  21.200  96.9 
9.5  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.500 0.000 2.500  21.875  100.0 
Table 2: Varying the cost differential  
 
 
                                                           
27 In section 3.2.1 we showed that p1 in case 3 of the trade model is smaller than in cases 1 and 2. The relative 
performance regarding welfare must be higher in case 3. 32 
Similar to our linear model in section 4, the relative performance regarding welfare is 
higher in the trade model, even when retail price p1 is lower in the competition model. 
However, increasing the marginal cost differential by increasing c0 reduces such welfare 
differential. Higher marginal costs reduce A￿s incentives in the competition model to engage 
in market 1 by itself. A reduces own production volume and leaves the market to its 
competitor B. The increasing engagement of B increases the overall production efficiency. 
The negative effect of a higher p1 is overcompensated by the higher production efficiency. 
The net effect regarding welfare is positive. At the end where c0 = 9.5 A decides in both 
models to stop own production and welfare is equal in both models (case 1). 
  In section 4 we showed that an increasing concavity of the demand curve increases 
retail price p1 in the competition model less strong than in the trade model. In case of a 
strong concave demand curve consumers would prefer a competition model because of a 
lower retail price compared to the trade model. From equation (18) we know that with a 
concave demand the price differential between the competition and the trade case is larger. 
However, this means that the inefficient production of A will also be higher compared to the 
case with linear demand. Therefore a higher concavity of demand reduces the overall 
production efficiency in the competition model. The net effect regarding welfare is shown in 
Table 3. We assume b = 1, k = 12, c0 = 8 c1 = 1, cB = 2 and vary the curvature of the demand 
curve, which is described by η. 
 
 
 Trade  Competition  WComp 
(WTrade
/100) 
η p 1Trade p T q 1Trade W Trade p 1Comp q 1AComp q 1Comp W Comp  
0.6  8.094 5.750 9.689  73.233 8.086 0.069 9.721  73.014  99.7 
0.7  8.540 6.118 5.890  46.915 8.473 0.336 6.054  45.910  97.9 
0.8  8.914 6.444 4.091  33.894 8.770 0.482 4.331  32.528  96.0 
0.9  9.230 6.737 3.102  26.499 9.006 0.560 3.383  24.980  94.3 
1.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.200 0.600 2.800  20.300  92.8 
1.1  9.732 7.238 2.105  18.776 9.365 0.620 2.413  17.187  91.5 
1.2  9.934 7.455 1.831  16.588 9.509 0.629 2.140  15.001  90.4 
1.3  10.110 7.652 1.632  14.979 9.635 0.633 1.939  13.399  89.5 
1.4  10.264 7.833 1.483  13.757 9.749 0.632 1.785  12.185  88.6 
1.5  10.400 8.000 1.368  12.804 9.851 0.631 1.665  11.239  87.8 
Table 3: Varying the curvature of the demand curve 
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Total welfare in the trade model is always higher than in the competition model. As 
mentioned above, the ratio p1Comp to p1Trade decreases with increased concavity of the 
demand curve (higher η). Nevertheless, welfare decreases stronger in the competition 
model than in the trade model. Obviously the effect regarding lower production efficiency 





We showed that both, the introduction of competition by common carriage on the one side 
and trade on the other side, enhance the efficiency of water supply. Since water utilities 
often face very different marginal costs due to the use of different raw water resources or 
different production scales, the exchange of treated water increases the efficiency of the 
overall water production and reduces the relevant retail price. Both competition and trade 
allow less efficient suppliers to reduce own production volume and/or to overcome their 
capacity constraints while more efficient suppliers enhance production volume by raising 
their treatment facilities￿ rate of capacity utilisation. Significant welfare gains can be 
achieved. However, welfare gains are not the same in the two models. Depending on 
bargaining power and the slope of the demand curve effects on production efficiency, retail 
prices, resulting welfare and the distribution of additional profits can differ.  Welfare tends 
to be higher in the trade case.  
The average efficiency of production is lower in the competition model since the less 
efficient utility keeps own production. However, aggregate production may rise in the 
competition model due to the entry of the inefficient utility. The net effect on welfare is 
therefore a priori unclear. But we showed that the relevant welfare gains from an increased 
production are of second order whereas the welfare losses from reduced production 
efficiency are of first order. Therefore the introduction of trade causes higher or at least 
similar welfare gains than the introduction of competition. In both models the upstream 
company skims the main part of the additional profit. But one should have in mind that the 
role of A and B change fundamentally in these models. A is the upstream company in the 
competition model but the downstream company in the trade model. Obviously the less 
efficient utility A tends to prefer the competition model while the more efficient utility B 
prefers the trade model. Consumers in contrast prefer the competition model when retail 
prices are lower.  
  The trade model￿s relative performance regarding welfare can even be increased by 
enhancing  A￿s bargaining power. We analysed welfare and distribution of profits in a 
second polar case where the less efficient utility A has the entire bargaining power. Then A 34 
purchases water from B at pT = cB. Such price must be lower than in the trade model where 
B has the entire bargaining power: due to the lower relevant marginal costs caused by the 
lower trade price, A enhances its engagement in market 1 and reduces the retail price p1. 
Now, A can extract the full rent of the additional efficiency. This shows that the relative 
performance of these two models significantly depends on the utilities￿ bargaining power. 
An interesting extension would be applying the concept of bargaining power to the 
competition model. For example B￿s bargaining power and therefore market position can be 
improved by implementing an effective access price regulation. However, as mentioned in 
section 4.4 the regulation of access prices in the water industry would be very complex and 
costly in practice. One can except that an incumbent￿s freedom to set the access price would 
still be significant. A further extension is the regulation of retail prices. Introducing a price 
cap into the model improves the production efficiency in the competition model. 
Nevertheless, welfare still tends to be higher in the trade model. 
Although we designed our model to examine a ￿ in our view ￿ important feature in 
the water industry, our analysis might also be applicable to other industries as well. In 
general, it applies to market structures (i) that are characterized by geographically 
separated natural monopolies and (ii) where access to the incumbent￿s infrastructure by 
neighboured monopolies is possible. Obviously relevant examples are local network based 
services. It is important to note that our model is not applicable for two-way networks such 
as railroad and for industries where customers￿ utility depends on how many customers are 
connected to this network. This is the main difference of the present analysis to the existing 
network models of the telecommunications industry. 
  From a broader perspective the results of the model relativise the benefits of 
common carriage in the water market. Due to its local extension and the regulation 
difficulties welfare gains of competition are expected to be minor. Allowing simple trade 
between neighboured water suppliers could lead to similar or even higher welfare gains ￿ 
without any regulation effort. And obviously trade between utilities can be implemented 
much easier in practice than competition by common carriage. Profit-maximising utilities 
have incentives to introduce voluntarily cross boarder trade, whereas competition needs 
extensive and complex economic regulation. And in contrast to competition political 
resistance against trade would be minor. Opponents of privatisation and competition in the 
water sector emphasise the importance of water as base for live. According to their 
argumentation water is rather a common than an economic good that could be provided by 
a private and therefore profit oriented company (see e.g. WWF 2003, Section 2). In the line 
of this argumentation the European Commission defined in its Water Framework Directive 
(Directive 2000/60/EC): ￿Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a 
heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such￿. Based on this 35 
fundamental statement the Water Framework Directive does not include any guidelines or 
recommendations about privatisation or competition. Beside political resistance there is a 
wide range of legal barriers for competition in the water sector. In countries such as 
Germany or Switzerland the principle of territorial exclusivity (Oertlichkeitsprinzip 
respectively Territorialprinzip) hinders the introduction of common carriage (see Andersen 
and Reichhard 2000, p. 29). 
Of course trade between neighboured utilities is already practiced by existing water 
utilities in several countries. However, in most cases trade is only used in order to balance 
peaks of demand ￿ efficient spot water markets usually do not exist. Obviously an extension 
of water trade would lead to further welfare gains. But local water suppliers are often not 
profit-oriented since they are part of the public authority. As a result they try to be as 
independent as possible. Our model showed that profit-maximising utilities would have 
incentives to introduce voluntarily cross boarder trade, since profits can be improved. 
However, there are several arguments against profit-maximisation in the piped water 
industry. Further research could examine how to promote efficient trade between non-profit 
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